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Proposition 47 is a California voter initiative that reduced possessory drug offenses and minor thefts from felonies to misdemeanors. The law allows individuals
to retroactively reclassify their convictions and mandates that these convictions shall
be considered misdemeanors “for all purposes.” Under California law, reclassified
convictions cannot be predicate felonies for future state sentencing enhancements.
However, federal courts have held that reclassified convictions still constitute prior
convictions for federal sentencing enhancements. Thus, these convictions still trigger
felony-based enhancements. This Comment argues that this result is not mandated
by Supreme Court precedent and that it conflicts with California’s intent to ameliorate the effects of prior felony convictions. Proposition 47 presents a novel situation—
a retroactive state law that broadly alters the underlying conviction. Under principles of comity and federalism, federal courts should give full effect to Proposition 47
and similar state laws in federal sentencing.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1800
I. BACKGROUND ON STATE PREDICATE OFFENSES ......................................... 1802
A. Criminal Justice Reform and the States.......................................... 1802
1. State reclassification laws. ........................................................ 1803
2. Proposition 47. ........................................................................... 1804
B. State Offenses in the Federal System .............................................. 1806
1. Overview of the federal sentencing system. ............................. 1806
2. Felony-based enhancements. .................................................... 1808
3. State law and predicate offenses............................................... 1811
II. COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACHES ................................................................ 1813
A. Supreme Court Precedent on State Predicate Offenses .................. 1813
B. Lower Federal Courts’ Application of Precedent ............................. 1816
1. Prospective state laws. .............................................................. 1816
2. Retroactive state laws. .............................................................. 1816
C. The California Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Proposition 47 . 1819

† BS 2015, Northwestern University; JD Candidate 2021, The University of Chicago
Law School.

1799

1800

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1799

D. Federal Circuit Courts’ Approach to Proposition 47 ....................... 1820
1. “Felony drug offense” under § 841 of the CSA.......................... 1821
2. “Felony” under the Guidelines. ................................................. 1823
3. Postconviction relief for sentencing enhancements based on
reclassified convictions. ............................................................. 1824
III. GIVING EFFECT TO RETROACTIVE STATE LAW CHANGES IN FEDERAL
SENTENCING .............................................................................................. 1825
A. Legal Precedent Supports Giving Effect to Retroactive
Reclassification ................................................................................. 1825
1. Proposition 47 is broader than expungement or dismissal. ..... 1825
2. Federal courts should not focus on literal vacatur. .................. 1828
3. Retroactivity alters the historical fact of conviction. ............... 1831
B. Federalism and Proposition 47......................................................... 1833
1. Principles of comity.................................................................... 1834
2. Federal supremacy is not threatened by Proposition 47.......... 1836
3. Recidivism, national uniformity, and federal sentencing concerns
do not support the courts’ current approach. ........................... 1838
C. Impact on Federal Sentencing and Resentencing ........................... 1841
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 1843

INTRODUCTION
Vickie Sanders was convicted in a California state court of
felony drug possession, 1 sixteen years before California voters
would pass Proposition 47. 2 Proposition 47, which was passed in
2014, reduces most possessory drug offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, 3 and allows California courts to retroactively redesignate individuals’ felonies as misdemeanors. 4 Sanders pursued redesignation of her felony, and in 2018, a California state court
reclassified her state conviction to a misdemeanor. 5 Over twenty
years after her initial conviction, and shortly after her prior conviction was designated a misdemeanor, a federal district court
held that Sanders’s misdemeanor still constituted a felony under
federal law. 6 Due to federal sentencing enhancements, Sanders’s
1
United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 898–99 (7th Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S
Ct 2661 (2019). Sanders was convicted in 1996, but her conviction did not become final
until 1998. Id.
2
Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), 2014 Cal Legis Serv Prop
47, codified at Cal Penal Code § 1170.18.
3
Sanders, 909 F3d at 899. See also J. Richard Couzens and Tricia A. Bigelow, Proposition 47: “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” *36 (May 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/HDL9-X2GZ.
4
Sanders, 909 F3d at 900, quoting Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k).
5
Sanders, 909 F3d at 899.
6
See id.
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prior “felony” triggered a mandatory imprisonment of 120
months. 7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 8
Federal courts have uniformly ignored Proposition 47’s mandate to treat reclassified convictions as misdemeanors “for all purposes.” 9 Rather, they have held that reclassified misdemeanors
still trigger harsh sentencing enhancements based on prior felony
convictions. 10 These holdings are in direct conflict with California
courts’ approach to Proposition 47. As one California court explained, “Proposition 47 explicitly anticipates that redesignation
of an offense as a misdemeanor will affect the collateral consequences of a felony conviction.” 11 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court has held that reclassified misdemeanors are misdemeanors for purposes of state sentencing. 12
Federal courts generally consider federal, not state, criminal
law. But when applying federal recidivist enhancements, which
increase a defendant’s sentence based on prior criminal convictions, federal courts must consider state convictions in discerning
relevant prior convictions. Federal courts define what a “prior
conviction” is, even when the prior conviction is a state conviction. 13 And in the case of Proposition 47, federal courts have defined “prior felony conviction” to include convictions that California has explicitly defined as a misdemeanor “for all purposes.” 14
This Comment argues that federal courts should give effect
to Proposition 47. It proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes
the role of predicate state offenses in federal sentencing and Proposition 47’s attempts to reclassify certain California felony convictions as misdemeanors. Part II examines how the Supreme Court
has dealt with state law changes to predicate offenses, and how
federal circuit courts have applied that precedent. It also considers federal courts’ current approach to Proposition 47—that Proposition 47 has no effect on federal sentencing. Part III.A first argues that the federal courts’ approach is not mandated by
Supreme Court precedent, and that it misunderstands Proposition 47’s effects on prior convictions. Parts III.B and III.C then
Id at 898.
Id at 906.
9
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k).
10 See Part II.D.
11 Sanders, 909 F3d at 900, quoting People v Khamvongsa, 214 Cal Rptr 3d 623, 625
(Cal App 2017).
12 See Part II.C.
13 See Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc, 460 US 103, 111–12 (1983).
14 See, for example, Sanders, 909 F3d at 900–01.
7
8
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consider how giving Proposition 47 effect in federal court would
positively impact the federal-state balance of power and federal
sentencing. In light of these effects, federal courts should hold that
Proposition 47 invalidates predicate offenses for federal sentencing.
I. BACKGROUND ON STATE PREDICATE OFFENSES
This Part summarizes the states’ attempts to enact criminal
justice reform, including Proposition 47 and its impact on certain
California offenses. It then briefly explains the role of state offenses in the federal sentencing system and how California altering its criminal offenses affects federal sentencing.
A.

Criminal Justice Reform and the States

Criminal justice reform has primarily occurred at the state
level, 15 despite bipartisan support for reform at both the state and
federal levels. 16 Congress has traditionally acted slowly and
passed only modest changes. 17 Even with recent federal reforms,
the states have continued to lead the way in passing numerous
and varied criminal justice laws. These reforms include (but are
not limited to): liberalizing marijuana laws, strengthening opioid
laws, changing bail procedures, and reducing the collateral consequences for felony convictions. 18

15 See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 128 Yale L
J F 791, 794 n 16 (2019).
16 See id at 793 n 14; Maggie Astor, Left and Right Agree on Criminal Justice: They
Were Both Wrong Before (NY Times, May 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UCA6
-422U; Jennifer Bellamy, Dan Zeidman, and Amshula Jararam, Promising Beginning: Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform in Key States *7–41 (American Civil Liberties Union,
Feb 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/R9KS-GD72. Although there is broad consensus
on the general need for reform, at least one scholar has noted that this consensus is “tenuous,” and “relies upon different frames and different goals.” Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 Mich L Rev 259, 263 (2018).
17 See Hopwood, 128 Yale L J F at 793 (cited in note 15). The exception to this historical trend is the recently passed First Step Act of 2018, Pub L No 115-391, 132
Stat 5194. The First Step Act enacted multiple reforms, including reducing statutory punishments for a variety of offenses. See id at 798–99.
18 See Nicole D. Porter, Top Trends in State Criminal Justice Reform, 2019 (The Sentencing Project, Jan 17, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/CP42-ENFJ. See also Robert
Alt, Criminal Justice Reform: A Survey of 2018 State Laws *4–5 (The Federalist Society,
July 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5WUZ-GBRQ.
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1. State reclassification laws.
A recent state trend is enacting laws that reclassify certain
felonies as misdemeanors. 19 Starting with California’s Proposition 47 in 2014, at least six states have passed reclassification
laws, 20 and several others have introduced reclassification bills.21
Though these laws vary by state, all enacted and proposed laws
reclassify simple drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor.
Almost all of the enacted laws define drug possession broadly by
not specifying weight or drug type. 22 Some (including Proposition 47) also raise the dollar threshold for felony theft. 23 However,
most have exclusions for people with prior criminal convictions. 24
Additionally, most of these reclassification laws are purely
prospective. 25 That means that people who commit simple drug
possession in the future will be convicted of and sentenced to a
misdemeanor, but people who have already been convicted cannot
reclassify their felonies and receive lower sentences. Nor can they
remove the collateral consequences of their felony conviction,
which can include employment restrictions and disenfranchisement. 26 For those and other reasons, numerous commentators
have noted the importance of retroactivity in various areas of
criminal justice reform. 27
19 See Brian Elderbroom and Julia Durnan, Reclassified: State Drug Law Reforms to
Reduce Felony Convictions and Increase Second Chances *3–6 (Urban Institute, Oct 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/HVF5-KFSX (explaining the growth of state reclassification
laws).
20 See id at *1 (discussing recent laws in California, Utah, Connecticut, Alaska, and
Oklahoma); 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291, codified in scattered sections of Colo Rev Stat
§ 18-18.
21 A reclassification bill is currently pending in the Ohio state legislature, and a
Rhode Island bill recently died in committee. See Michael Shields, Reclassifying Drug Felonies Would Open Career Pathways - Retroactivity Would Maximize Reach (Policy Matters
Ohio, Jan 15, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/N2BE-63GC; American Civil Liberties
Union of Rhode Island, Drug Reclassification (H 5760, S 472) Died in Committee (2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/Z39V-8TKW.
22 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *4–5 (cited in note 19). The Colorado
law is the only enacted law to specify weights and types of drug. See 2019 Colo Sess Laws
Ch 291 §§ 1–2, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-18-403.5, -406.
23 See Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *27 (cited in note 3). See also, for example, 2016 Okla Sess Laws Ch 221 § 4, codified at 21 Okla Stat § 1704.
24 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *4–5 (cited in note 19). See also, for
example, 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291 § 8, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3-801.
25 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *5 (cited in note 19). See also, for
example, 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291 § 6, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3-501.
26 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *1–3 (cited in note 19).
27 See, for example, Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Note, Redrawing the Line: Retroactive
Sentence Reductions, Mass Incarceration, and the Battle between Justice and Finality,

1804

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1799

However, two states—Oklahoma and California—have made
their reclassification laws retroactive. 28 That means the law affects people who have already been convicted of a felony that is
now classified as a misdemeanor. The extent to which prior convictions are affected depends on the law. Under Oklahoma’s law,
people with felony convictions that are now classified as misdemeanors can expunge their records, 29 and people who are currently serving applicable felony sentences can apply for an accelerated process to commute or modify their sentence. 30 As
discussed in the next Section, Proposition 47 is retroactive in that
people with prior felony convictions can apply for resentencing (if
they are still serving the felony sentence) or redesignation (if they
have already served the felony sentence). 31
2. Proposition 47.
Proposition 47 amends various provisions of the California
criminal code to reduce most possessory drug offenses and thefts
involving less than $950 from felonies to misdemeanors. 32 The
maximum punishment for any newly misdemeanant offense is
one year, unless the defendant has a designated prior conviction. 33
A person currently serving a sentence for a felony that would
be a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 may petition for resentencing. 34 If the petition is successful, “the petitioner’s felony
54 Harv CR–CL L Rev 299, 320–25 (2019); Jeremy Haile, Farewell, Fair Cruelty: An Argument for Retroactive Relief in Federal Sentencing, 47 U Toledo L Rev 635, 640–42 (2016);
Shields, Reclassifying Drug Felonies (cited in note 21) (arguing that Ohio’s proposed reclassification bill should be retroactive).
28 The Oklahoma legislature recently amended its reclassification law—which was
passed through a 2016 ballot measure—to apply retroactively. See 2019 Okla Sess Laws
Ch 459, codified at 22 Okla Stat § 18; Porter, Top Trends in State Criminal Justice Reform
at *1 (cited in note 18).
29 2019 Okla Sess Laws Ch 459 § 51, codified at 22 Okla Stat § 18.A.15.
30 2019 Okla Sess Laws Ch 459, codified at 57 Okla Stat § 332.2.F.
31 For a full discussion of how the California Supreme Court has interpreted Proposition 47’s retroactivity, see Part II.C.
32 Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *27 (cited in note 3).
33 See id at *137. Proposition 47 does not apply to defendants with a prior conviction
for a designated offense, and these defendants may be sentenced up to three years imprisonment. For more information on these disqualifying offenses, see note 43 and accompanying text.
34 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(a):
(a) A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction,
whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a
misdemeanor under the act that added this section (“this act”) had this act been
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sentence shall be recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a misdemeanor,” unless the court determines that the defendant poses
a danger to the public. 35 A person who has completed her sentence
for a felony that would be a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 can
file an application before her court of sentencing. 36 Then, the court
“shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.”37
Proposition 47 expressly states that “[a] felony conviction
that is recalled and resentenced . . . or designated as a misdemeanor . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”38
However, petitioners whose convictions have been resentenced
are still subject to firearm restrictions. 39 Judges can also deny petitions for resentencing if the prisoner “pose[s] an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety,” 40 and Proposition 47 does not
in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request
resentencing in accordance with [s]ections . . . amended or added by this act.
35

Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b):

(b) Upon receiving a petition under subdivision (a), the court shall determine
whether the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a). If the petitioner
satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a), the petitioner’s felony sentence shall be
recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a misdemeanor pursuant to [s]ections
. . . amended or added by this act, unless the court, in its discretion, determines
that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety.
36

Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(f):

(f) A person who has completed his or her sentence for a conviction, whether by
trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor
under this act had this act been in effect at the time of the offense, may file an
application before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his
or her case to have the felony conviction or convictions designated as misdemeanors.
37

Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(g):

(g) If the application satisfies the criteria in subdivision (f), the court shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.
38 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the California
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “for all purposes” language, see Part II.C.
39 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k):

A felony conviction that is recalled and resentenced under subdivision (b) or designated as a misdemeanor under subdivision (g) shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes, except that resentencing shall not permit that person
to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control a firearm or prevent his
or her conviction under [California’s felon in possession of a firearm statute].
40 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b). An “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”
means “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony.” Cal
Penal Code § 1170.18(c). When determining whether a petitioner poses such a risk, the
court can consider the petitioner’s criminal history, disciplinary and rehabilitations records while incarcerated, and any other relevant evidence. Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b).
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apply to any person who has previously been convicted of certain
violent offenses or offenses requiring sex offender registration.41
Finally, the statute notes that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this
section does not diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in
any case that does not come within the purview of this section.” 42
B. State Offenses in the Federal System
Proposition 47, like other state sentencing reforms, only
changes California criminal offenses and does not expressly affect
federal incarceration. However, because parts of the federal sentencing system depend on state offenses, Proposition 47’s changes
to state offenses affect federal sentencing as well. This Section
surveys the federal sentencing system, specific sentencing enhancements, and the role of state offenses in federal sentencing.
1. Overview of the federal sentencing system.
When a defendant is convicted of an offense in federal court,
federal law governs the sentencing process. Three main sources
of law guide federal sentencing. First, the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 43 (SRA) created the modern federal sentencing system by
setting forth the primary sentencing statute 44 and facilitating the
creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). 45 Second, the Guidelines create recommended sentencing
ranges based on the defendant’s instant federal offense and prior

41 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(i). See Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *134–36
(cited in note 3) (listing Proposition 47’s disqualifying prior convictions).
42 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(n).
43 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and
28 USC § 991 et seq.
44 See 18 USC § 3553(a). Section 3553(a)(1) directs courts to consider certain factors
in sentencing. These factors include: the “nature and circumstance of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” the sentencing range established by the
Guidelines, and pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission. 18 USC
§ 3553(a). See also Erica Zunkel, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s Undervalued Sentencing Command: Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with Rehabilitation, Training, and Treatment in “the Most Effective Manner”, 9 Notre Dame J Intl & Comp L 49, 54 (2019) (noting
that § 3553(a) “has become the federal sentencing touchstone” since the Guidelines became advisory).
45 See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing: The Basics *1
(Nov 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/52NG-ALEU (“[In] the landmark passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) . . . Congress established a new federal sentencing
system based primarily on sentencing guidelines.”). See also generally United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov 2018) (USSG).
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criminal history. 46 Third, some federal statutes mandate minimum and maximum sentences tied to the defendant’s offense. 47
Federal sentencing law is a mix of advisory and mandatory
provisions. The Guidelines are advisory, but continue to exert significant influence on federal sentencing. 48 The Supreme Court has
made clear that judges should begin sentencing proceedings by
calculating the defendant’s Guidelines range, even though judges
are not required to follow that range. 49 Statutory minimum and
maximum sentences, on the other hand, are typically mandatory. 50 If a mandatory sentence applies, the judge must impose it.
Both the Guidelines and federal statutes contain sentencing
enhancements, which increase the length of the defendant’s sentence based on certain facts. There are two types of enhancements: nonrecidivist and recidivist. 51 Nonrecidivist enhancements are based on the particular circumstances of the offense,
such as the presence of a gun during the crime. 52 Recidivist enhancements are “based on a defendant’s prior criminal history.”53
These enhancements are typically triggered by a prior conviction
for a specified offense (called a predicate offense). For example,
the federal three-strikes law imposes mandatory life imprisonment if the defendant is convicted of “a serious violent felony” and
has previously been convicted of at least two qualifying felonies. 54
Recidivist enhancements are common in the US system. Every
46 See Jeff Papa and Chris Kashman, An Introduction to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 51 Ind L Rev 357, 358–60 (2018) (explaining how the Guidelines calculate a
defendant’s sentencing range). For the Guidelines’ sentencing table, see USSG § 5A
(demonstrating how the defendant’s offense level and criminal history interact to create
the defendant’s sentencing range).
47 See United States Sentencing Commission, Overview of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System *10–19 (July 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/X8GH-T84E (explaining federal mandatory minimum sentences and
overviewing common mandatory minimums and maximums).
48 See Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years of
Mandatory Minimums, Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U Toledo L Rev 649,
678–80 (2016).
49 Id at 678, citing Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 49 (2007). The Guidelines were
mandatory for almost twenty years before the Supreme Court held that they were advisory
in United States v Booker, 543 US 220 (2005). Empirical studies have shown that although
Booker impacted various disparities in sentencing, it did not dramatically reduce sentence
length. See Hofer, 47 U Toledo L Rev at 678–89 (cited in note 48).
50 Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 UC Davis L Rev 1135, 1158 (2010).
51 Id at 1143.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 18 USC § 3559(c)(1).
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state has statutory recidivist enhancements, and there are numerous recidivist enhancements in the federal statutes and
Guidelines. 55
2. Felony-based enhancements.
Recidivist enhancements are often based on prior felony convictions.56 Because Proposition 47 reclassifies some California felonies to misdemeanors, it implicates many of these enhancements.
A felony “is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”57 Both the advisory Guidelines
and mandatory federal statutes have felony-based enhancements.
The Guidelines contain numerous recidivist enhancements
specifically tied to the defendant’s instant federal offense. 58 These
enhancements increase the defendant’s offense level—which
leads to a longer recommended sentence 59—if the defendant has
a prior criminal conviction. For example, if the defendant’s instant offense is for unlawfully entering or remaining in the
United States, her offense level (and thus recommended sentence)
increases if she previously sustained a felony conviction. 60
Regardless of the defendant’s instant offense, the Guidelines
also separately factor in the defendant’s criminal history, meaning prior felony convictions are always relevant. The defendant’s
criminal history is calculated on a point-based system, with
points given for “each prior sentence of imprisonment.” 61 Three
points are given for each sentence “exceeding one year and one
month,” two points for those “of at least sixty days,” and one point
for any sentence not previously counted. 62 More points correlate
See Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1149–50 (cited in note 50).
Id (discussing state and federal recidivist enhancements).
57 See Burgess v United States, 553 US 124, 130 (2008). See also USSG § 4A1.2(o)
(“[A] ‘felony offense’ means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed.”).
58 Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1138 (cited in note 50) (noting that the Guidelines
“contain enhancement provisions for virtually every type of federal offense”).
59 USSG § 5A.
60 See USSG § 2L1.2(b). This illegal reentry enhancement increases the defendant’s
offense level depending on the type of prior conviction and the number of prior convictions.
For example, if he committed the instant offense after sustaining “a conviction for a felony
offense . . . for which the sentence imposed was five years or more,” his offense level is
increased by ten levels. USSG § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A). If the imposed sentence for the prior felony
“exceeded one year and one month,” his offense level is only increased by six levels. USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(2)(C).
61 USSG § 4A1.1.
62 See USSG § 4A.1.1. The calculation includes other limitations and adds points for
other actions related to the defendant’s criminal history. See USSG § 4A.1.1:
55
56
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to a higher criminal history category, resulting in a longer recommended sentence. 63 Sentences “exceeding one year and one
month” receive the most points and encompass most felony (but
not misdemeanor) offenses. However, the criminal history calculation exempts certain prior convictions.64 For example, it does not
count expunged convictions65 and diversionary dispositions without
a finding of guilt,66 but convictions that are set aside or pardoned
“for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law” are counted.67
Some of the specific enhancements have similar exceptions.68

(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and
one month.
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days
not counted in (a).
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4
points for this subsection.
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
(e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of
violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such
sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this subsection.
See USSG § 5A.
Although the definitions for criminal history calculation use the term “prior sentence”, “the definitions for ‘prior sentence’ essentially equate ‘prior sentence’ with prior
conviction.” Thomas W. Hutchison, Sigmund G. Popko, Deborah Young, Michael P. O’Connor, and Celia M. Rumann, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 4A1.1.5(b) (2020 ed).
The Guidelines define “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.” USSG
§ 4A1.2(a)(1). A “sentence of imprisonment” is “a sentence of incarceration and refers to
the maximum sentence imposed.” USSG § 4A1.2(b)(1). The determination of the length of
the sentence of imprisonment is “based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time
actually served.” Hutchison, et al, Federal Sentencing Law § 4A1.1.6(a).
65 USSG § 4A1.2(j). Expunged convictions can still be considered if the judge decides
to depart from the sentencing range due to the inadequacy of the criminal history category.
USSG § 4A1.3.
66 USSG § 4A1.2(f).
67 USSG § 4A1.2 n 10:
63
64

A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous
convictions may be set aside or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law, e.g., in order to restore civil rights or to
remove the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting
from such convictions are to be counted. However, expunged convictions are not
counted.
68 See, for example, USSG § 2K2.1 n 10 (directing courts to “use only those felony convictions that receive criminal history points” when applying the firearm recidivist enhancement).
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Many federal statutory enhancements are also based on felonies. 69 These enhancements are typically mandatory. 70 They
lengthen the defendant’s sentence by increasing the mandatory
minimum or maximum sentence. 71 One statutory enhancement
that often arises in Proposition 47 litigation is the “felony drug
offense” enhancement. Section 841 of the Controlled Substances
Act 72 (CSA) mandates enhancements if the defendant commits
certain drug offenses “after a prior conviction for a felony drug
offense has become final.” 73 A felony drug offense is a federal,
state, or foreign drug offense “punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.” 74 Prior to the First Step Act of 2018, 75 § 841
doubled the mandatory minimum if the defendant had a prior
conviction. 76 The First Step Act amended § 841, which now increases the maximum sentence allowed by statute if the defendant has a prior felony drug offense. 77 Unlike the Guidelines and
some statutory enhancements, § 841 does not explicitly exempt
any prior convictions.

69 For example, one common statutory enhancement is contained in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at
18 USC § 924(e). The ACCA mandates fifteen years to life imprisonment if the defendant
is convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and he has “three previous convictions . . .
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 USC § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a
“violent felony” as an offense with an element of force that is punishable by at least one
year, or an offense that is enumerated in the statute. 18 USC § 924(e)(2)(B). A “serious
drug offense” is defined as an offense involving a controlled substance that has a maximum
imprisonment of ten years or more, which encompasses felony drug offenses. 18 USC
§ 924(e)(2)(A).
70 Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 50).
71 Id at 1158.
72 Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1242 (1970), codified as amended at 21 USC § 801 et seq.
73 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C), (D), (E)(ii), (E)(iii)(2)–(3).
74 See 21 USC § 802(44); Burgess, 553 US at 130 (holding that § 841(b)’s “felony drug
offense” is defined by § 802(44)).
75 Pub L No 115-391, 132 Stat 5194.
76 See United States Sentencing Commission and Office of Education & Sentencing
Practice, ESP Insider Express Special Edition: First Step Act *2 (Feb 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/5FQR-6AP8. For example, § 841(b)(1)(A), which has a ten-year statutory
penalty, previously imposed a twenty-year mandatory sentence if the defendant had one
prior conviction for a felony drug offense—in essence, a recidivist enhancement of ten
years. Id.
77 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C) (increases the maximum sentence from twenty to thirty
years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(D) (from five to ten years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(E)(ii) (from
twenty to thirty years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(E)(iii)(2) (from five to ten years); 21 USC
§ 841(b)(1)(E)(iii)(3) (from one to four years).
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3. State law and predicate offenses.
Federal law governs the mechanics of applying federal recidivist enhancements. Although a federal enhancement can be
based on a state conviction for a state offense, federal law defines
which offenses constitute a predicate offense. 78 The meaning of
“conviction” depends on the statute. 79 Absent a clear indication to
the contrary, federal law (not state law) defines “conviction.”80
Unlike the facts triggering mandatory nonrecidivist enhancements (which must be found by a jury), the fact of a prior conviction can be found by a judge. 81 When determining whether a conviction triggers an enhancement, federal courts generally look to
the law that applied at the time of the prior conviction. 82
Under federal law, a state’s postconviction actions generally
do not alter federal sentencing. This is despite the large number
of state laws that provide postconviction relief. 83 These laws vary
by jurisdiction. A common form of postconviction relief is expungement, which removes a past conviction from an individual’s
criminal record. 84 Additionally, many states have diversionary
78

text.

For examples of predicate offense definitions, see notes 69–74 and accompanying

See Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc, 460 US 103, 113 n 7 (1983).
See id at 111–12 (“Whether one has been ‘convicted’ within the language of the
[federal] gun control statutes is necessarily . . . a question of federal, not state, law, despite
the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the
State.”); id at 119–20 (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication to the contrary . . . it is to be
assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not intend to make its application
dependent on state law.”), quoting NLRB v Natural Gas Utility District, 402 US 600, 603
(1971); United States v Dyke, 718 F3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir 2013) (“Neither, of course, does
state law normally dictate the meaning of a federal statute, at least absent some evidence
Congress sought to defer to and incorporate state law.”); United States v Martinez-Cortez,
354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004) (“Whether an earlier sentence counts for [the Guidelines’]
criminal history purposes is a question of federal law.”).
81 See Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). See also
Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1146–48 (cited in note 50) (describing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence regarding sentencing enhancements and the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial).
82 See McNeill v United States, 563 US 816, 820 (2011) (looking at the state law that
applied at the time of defendant’s prior conviction to determine whether he was eligible
for a statutory enhancement). See also United States v Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx
523, 524 (9th Cir 2019) (following the holding from McNeill for a Guidelines enhancement).
83 See Restoration of Rights Project, 50-State Comparison: Judicial Expungement,
Sealing, and Set-aside (Dec 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4C3N-7NLD (noting each
state’s postconviction relief, including expungement, deferred adjudication, and pardon
laws).
84 See Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Expungement of Record”).
79
80
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dispositions, such as deferred judgments, which typically “prevent entry of the underlying judgment of conviction.” 85 An exception to the general rule that state action does not alter federal
sentencing is state court vacatur. The Supreme Court has explained that if a conviction is vacated or reversed on direct appeal,
it cannot constitute a predicate offense. 86
Under Proposition 47, certain offenses—namely, possessory
drug offenses and minor theft—no longer fit the federal definition
of felony. That is because Proposition 47 amended California’s
criminal code to reduce these offenses to misdemeanors with an
imprisonment term of one year or less. 87 Defendants have thus
challenged their federal enhancements under § 841 88 and the
Guidelines, 89 arguing that their reclassified convictions are no
longer predicate felonies. Defendants have argued this both on
direct appeal 90 and through postconviction challenges. 91
28 USC § 2255 provides the primary postconviction remedy
by which federal prisoners can challenge their sentences. 92 Section 2255 authorizes prisoners to move “to vacate, set aside or correct [their] sentence” if “the sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 93 There are a number of limits on § 2255 motions, including a one-year statute of
limitations and restrictions on filing second or successive motions. 94 Additionally, defendants cannot appeal a § 2255 motion
unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability, which is issued
only if the defendant “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 95 Though these limits on

85 Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Judgment”). See also James
A. Shapiro, Comity of Errors: When Federal Sentencing Guidelines Ignore State Law Decriminalizing Sentences, 41 Akron L Rev 231, 231 (2008).
86 See Part II.A.
87 Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *137–38 (cited in note 3). If the defendant
has previously been convicted of a designated prior, the court may sentence him to sixteen
months, two years, or three years. Id.
88 See Part II.D.1.
89 See Part II.D.2.
90 See, for example, United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 899 (7th Cir 2018).
91 See, for example, United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 611 (10th Cir 2019).
92 See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, and Orin S. Kerr, 7 Criminal Procedure § 28.9(a) (4th ed 2019).
93 28 USC § 2255(a).
94 See LaFave, et al, Criminal Procedure § 28.9(b) (cited in note 92).
95 28 USC § 2253(c). See also David G. Knibb, Federal Court of Appeals Manual
§ 16:2 (6th ed 2019) (explaining that the requirement of a certificate of appealability has
made § 2255 appeals “effectively . . . discretionary”).
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postconviction relief have posed obstacles, defendants have continued to challenge their enhanced sentences in the Proposition 47 context.
The Supreme Court has never considered a law like Proposition 47—a retroactive reclassification law. Nonetheless, the federal courts have almost uniformly rejected defendants’ direct and
postconviction challenges, as illustrated in the next Part.
II. COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACHES
Almost all federal courts to consider the issue have held that
Proposition 47 does not reclassify felonies for federal sentencing
enhancements. This result is not mandated by Supreme Court
precedent, and it conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s
holding that convictions reclassified under Proposition 47 do not
constitute predicate offenses for future state sentencing enhancements. The federal courts are thus out of step in their approach
to federal sentencing.
This Part considers when changes in state law affect federal
sentencing. Part II.A discusses Supreme Court precedent on this
topic. Part II.B examines how federal circuit courts have applied
this precedent to other state laws. Finally, Parts II.C and II.D
contrast the California and federal courts’ differing approaches to
Proposition 47.
A. Supreme Court Precedent on State Predicate Offenses
Supreme Court precedent on how state laws affect federal
sentencing is limited. The Court has never considered a retroactive reclassification state law like Proposition 47. It has, however,
considered a small number of other laws affecting state convictions. These decisions have laid the framework for determining
when state action alters prior convictions: federal law defines
“conviction,” and subsequent state actions generally do not affect
the historical fact of conviction.
In Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc, 96 the Supreme
Court held that an expunged conviction still constituted a predicate offense in the context of a federal gun statute. 97 First, the
Court established that “[w]hether one has been ‘convicted’ within
the language of the gun control statutes is necessarily . . . a

96
97

460 US 103 (1983).
Id at 114.
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question of federal, not state, law.” 98 This is true even though “the
predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the
State.” 99 Second, the Court acknowledged “an obvious exception
to the literal language of the [federal] statute for one whose predicate conviction had been vacated or reversed on direct appeal.”100
But the Court held that expungement under state law does not
fall into this exception for vacated or reversed convictions because
expungement “does not alter the historical fact of the conviction.” 101 It explained that “[expungement] does not alter the legality of the previous conviction and does not signify that the defendant was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.” 102
The Court next applied this reasoning in McNeill v United
States, 103 and held that a prospective change to the state’s definition of a predicate offense did not alter the defendant’s prior conviction. 104 Clifton Terelle McNeill was convicted of a North Carolina offense that, at the time of his conviction, had an
imprisonment term of at least ten years and thus qualified as a
predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act105
(ACCA). 106 By the time of his sentencing for the ACCA enhancement, North Carolina had lowered the imprisonment term such
that McNeill’s offense would no longer qualify. 107 The Court held
that this change did not affect his federal sentencing. 108 It explained that whether a defendant has a “previous conviction” is a
“backward-looking question.” 109 The only way to answer that “is
to consult the law that applied at the time of that conviction.”110
The Court noted that “[i]t cannot be correct that subsequent
Id at 115.
Id.
100 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. The Court explained that this “obvious exception” was
first recognized in a footnote in a case decided three years previously. Id, citing Lewis v
United States, 445 US 55, 61 n 5 (1980).
101 Dickerson, 460 US at 115.
102 Id. The Court referred to the law at issue in Dickerson as an “expunction” statute.
The terms expungement and expunction are interchangeable in this context: both refer to
laws that generally “remov[e] [ ] a conviction . . . from a person’s criminal record.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (defining “Expungement of Record”) (cited in note 84). For consistency,
this Comment solely uses the term “expungement.”
103 563 US 816 (2011).
104 Id at 824.
105 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at 18 USC § 924(e).
106 McNeill, 563 US at 818–19.
107 Id.
108 Id at 824.
109 Id at 820.
110 McNeill, 563 US at 820.
98
99
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changes in state law can erase an earlier conviction for ACCA
purposes.” 111 Despite this seemingly strong language, in a footnote, the Court declined to rule on a retroactive state law change:
[T]his case does not concern a situation in which a State subsequently lowers the maximum penalty applicable to an offense and makes that reduction available to defendants previously convicted and sentenced for that offense. . . . We do
not address whether or under what circumstances a federal
court could consider the effect of that state action. 112
Because Proposition 47 applies retroactively, McNeill’s holding
does not control whether convictions reclassified under Proposition 47 constitute predicate offenses.
In Johnson v United States, 113 the Court reaffirmed that a vacated conviction cannot constitute a predicate offense. 114 A Georgia state court vacated Samuel Johnson’s prior convictions because he had not affirmatively waived his right to counsel.115
Johnson then moved to vacate his ACCA enhancement under a
postconviction motion. 116 Although the Court held that the statute
of limitations had run on Johnson’s motion, it acknowledged that
he would have been entitled to federal resentencing if he had
timely filed. 117 In addition to reinforcing that vacated convictions
cannot be predicate offenses, the Court confirmed that a defendant who “successfully attack[s] his state conviction in state court
or on federal habeas review [can] then ‘apply for reopening of any
federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences.’” 118
Though the Supreme Court has articulated a general framework for determining whether state action alters prior convictions, numerous unanswered questions remain. The Court has
not answered how courts should analyze laws falling somewhere
between expungement (postconviction relief unrelated to the underlying legality of the conviction) and vacatur (which erases the
prior conviction, typically due to legal error or constitutional issues). Nor has it explained how retroactivity affects this analysis.
Id at 823.
Id at 825 n *.
113 544 US 295 (2005).
114 Id at 303 (“Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given a sentence enhanced
for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is vacated.”).
115 Id at 300.
116 Id at 301.
117 Johnson, 544 US at 302–03.
118 Id at 303, quoting Custis v United States, 511 US 485, 497 (1994).
111
112
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The next Section examines how the lower courts have approached
these issues.
B. Lower Federal Courts’ Application of Precedent
The lower federal courts have applied Supreme Court precedent narrowly. In general, they have held that state action does
not affect state convictions for federal sentencing purposes, regardless of whether that state action is prospective or retroactive.
1. Prospective state laws.
The federal circuit courts have held that most state laws altering predicate convictions do not affect federal sentencing. Under the Guidelines, circuit courts treat diversionary dispositions
as convictions. 119 And despite the Guidelines’ textual exemption
for expunged convictions, most courts still count expunged convictions that are not based on actual innocence or constitutional
invalidity. 120 For statutory enhancements, every circuit court to
consider the issue has held that “a deferred, expunged or dismissed state conviction qualifies as a prior conviction under
§ 841.” 121
2. Retroactive state laws.
However, some courts have suggested that retroactivity may
alter the above analysis. 122 Since McNeill, multiple circuits have
acknowledged that the Supreme Court left open the issue of retroactivity. 123 But prior to Proposition 47, no circuit court reached
Shapiro, 41 Akron L Rev at 231–32 (cited in note 85).
See, for example, United States v Townsend, 408 F3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir 2005);
United States v Dobovsky, 279 F3d 5, 8–9 (1st Cir 2002). See also Hutchison, et al, Federal
Sentencing Law § 4A1.1.5(m)(iii) (cited in note 64) (explaining that the majority of circuit
courts to consider the issue only discount “expungement to convictions set aside because
of innocence or errors of law”).
121 United States v Pritchett, 749 F3d 417, 426–27 (6th Cir 2014) (collecting cases).
122 Before McNeill was decided, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania law reducing certain felony drug offenses to misdemeanors did not alter the conviction for federal
sentencing purposes. See United States v McGlory, 968 F2d 309, 349 (3d Cir 1992). In a
footnote, the court noted that a retroactive provision in the state statute, which was later
struck down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “could have provided the result [defendant] desires.” Id at 351 n 33. After McNeill, several district courts have held that a
state law’s retroactivity affects defendants’ convictions for federal sentencing enhancements. See note 146 (discussing California district courts’ treatment of Proposition 47).
123 In considering New York sentencing reforms, which reduced penalties for certain
drug offenses and allowed retroactive resentencing for some incarcerated individuals, two
circuits noted McNeill’s open question. See Cortes-Morales v Hastings, 827 F3d 1009,
119
120
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the merits of whether a state law that retroactively alters the defendant’s conviction affects federal sentencing. Several circuits
have, however, considered retroactive changes to the defendant’s
sentence length.
Three circuits have held that a state court’s retroactive reduction to a defendant’s probation term does not affect the Guidelines’ criminal history calculation. 124 The Guidelines’ criminal history calculation adds points if the defendant committed his
instant federal offense while under probation. 125 To avoid having
points added, defendants sought and received retroactive state
court orders lowering their state probation term such that they
were not on probation when they committed their federal offense. 126 The circuits focused on the text of the Guidelines in their
analysis. Each noted that courts must count convictions that are
set aside for “reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law.”127
1013–14 (11th Cir 2016) (noting that the Court in McNeill “did not consider” a retroactive
reduction, and that “[a]ccordingly, [the defendant] can succeed on the merits of his claim
only if the New York sentencing reductions apply retroactively”); Rivera v United States,
716 F3d 685, 689 (2d Cir 2013) (clarifying that “[t]he state sentencing scheme considered
by the Court in McNeill, however, applied only prospectively, . . . and in a footnote, the
Supreme Court limited its holding to similarly non-retroactive statutory schemes.”). Because both circuits held that the law was not retroactive as to the defendant, they did not
reach this Comment’s topic. See Cortes-Morales, 827 F3d at 1015–16; Rivera, 716 F3d at
689–90.
Several federal district courts in New York have held that a prior conviction cannot
constitute a predicate offense if the New York law allows retroactive resentencing for the
defendant’s offense, even if the defendant himself is not eligible for resentencing. See
United States v Cabello, 401 F Supp 3d 362, 364, 366 n 5 (EDNY 2019); United States v
Calix, 2014 WL 2084098, *14–15 (SDNY); United States v Jackson, 2013 WL 4744828, *4
(SDNY). The Second Circuit discussed these cases when holding that failure to raise this
retroactivity argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel. See Saxon v United States,
695 F Appx 616, 620 (2d Cir 2017). Though not reaching the merits of the issue, the circuit
noted that “the import of [the McNeill] footnote . . . is far from clear,” and that it “[did] not
mean to suggest that we agree with . . . the conclusions of other district judges in the
Southern District of New York.” Id at 620–21.
124 See United States v Yepez, 704 F3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Yepez II);
United States v Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir 2009); United States v MartinezCortez, 354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004). See also Andrew Tan, Note, Breaking Bad Sentencing Habits: How State Courts’ Retroactive Modifications of Probation Terms Affect Federal Mandatory Sentencing, 86 S Cal L Rev 1079, 1096–1106 (2013) (discussing the circuits’ decisions).
125 See USSG § 4A1.1.(d).
126 Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1236–37; Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1089–90; Martinez-Cortez,
354 F3d at 832. The district courts in these cases used nunc pro tunc orders. Nunc pro
tunc means “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019). If a court enters an order nunc pro tunc, it “shall have the
same legal force and effect as if made at the time when it should have been made.” Id.
127 Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091, quoting USSG § 4A1.2 n 10 (“Even when a conviction is
set aside for ‘reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law,’ we still count the resulting
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Because the state courts modified the defendants’ state sentences
so that they received lower federal sentences, the state sentences
still counted for the Guidelines’ criminal history calculation. 128
Before being overturned en banc, a Ninth Circuit panel broke
with the other circuits and held that these sentences do not count.
The panel’s decision relied heavily on principles of comity and federalism. 129 Comity is the general principle that one sovereign
should respect another sovereign’s laws. 130 In the federal and
state context, this concept is intertwined with federalism: federal
courts should respect state courts’ decisions. 131 The panel explained that “[w]here, as here, state laws permit the modification
of ongoing terms of probation, principles of comity . . . require that
the federal courts should, where possible, recognize state court
actions terminating those probationary terms.” 132
The en banc court reversed the panel 6–5. 133 Though the
panel’s decision had primarily rested on comity and federalism,
the en banc majority did not deeply analyze these issues. 134 Rather, it noted that the panel’s approach was “closer to abdication
than comity” and that “[s]tate courts cannot be given the authority to change a defendant’s federal sentence.” 135
The Ninth Circuit panel’s deference to state courts and state
laws has not been followed by other federal circuits analyzing
Proposition 47. As the following sections discuss, the federal and
California courts have adopted conflicting approaches regarding
Proposition 47’s effect on recidivist enhancements.

sentence.”) (emphasis in original); Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1238, quoting Martinez-Cortez,
354 F3d at 832 (“[C]ourts must count sentences for convictions that, for reasons unrelated
to innocence or errors of law, are set aside or for which the defendant is pardoned.”).
128 See Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091; Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1238–39, quoting MartinezCortez, 354 F3d at 832.
129 See United States v Yepez, 652 F3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir 2011) (Yepez I), revd en
banc, 704 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 2012). For more information on principles of comity and federalism, see Part III.B.1.
130 See Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism, 90
Notre Dame L Rev 1310, 1312 (2015).
131 See Yepez I, 652 F3d at 1190 (“[P]rinciples of comity and federalism [ ] counsel
against substituting our judgment for that of the state courts.”), quoting Taylor v Maddox,
366 F3d 992, 999 (9th Cir 2004).
132 Yepez I, 652 F3d at 1190. See also Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1102–03 (Wardlaw dissenting).
133 See generally Yepez II, 704 F3d 1087. Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, who authored
the original panel decision, also authored the en banc dissent, which was joined by the
four other dissenters. The dissent reemphasized the original panel’s reasoning. See id
(Wardlaw dissenting).
134 See id at 1091 (majority).
135 Id.
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C. The California Supreme Court’s Interpretation of
Proposition 47
The California Supreme Court has held that the intent behind Proposition 47’s “for all purposes” language is to ameliorate
the collateral consequences of a felony conviction. 136 The California Supreme Court explained that “the fact that Proposition 47
did not expressly mention recidivist offenders does not mean that
voters intended to deny those resentenced under the measure any
further mitigation of their punishment.” 137 Rather,
[f]rom [ ] particular statements in the ballot materials for
Proposition 47, it follows that a reduced penalty for a crime
that had previously been classified as a felony would include
a penalty that takes the form of an enhancement or other recidivist-based punishment that was alleged with that same
felony. 138
The California Supreme Court has therefore held that reclassified convictions cannot be predicate felonies for future state sentencing enhancements. 139 Further, it held that Proposition 47
ameliorates some already imposed sentencing enhancements. A
sentencing enhancement based on a redesignated conviction can
be challenged if “the judgment containing the sentence enhancement was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.” 140 And regardless of finality, a defendant who successfully petitions for resentencing “may . . . challenge a felony-based enhancement
contained in the same judgment.” 141
The court reached this holding by explaining that Proposition 47’s resentencing and redesignation provisions “both clearly
reflect an intent to have full retroactive application.” 142 Though
Proposition 47’s directive that reclassified convictions “be misdemeanors for all purposes” does not use similar retroactive

See People v Buycks, 422 P3d 531, 545–56 (Cal 2018).
Id at 545.
138 Id at 546.
139 Id at 540 (“Proposition 47 . . . mandates that the reduced conviction ‘shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.’ . . . [This], therefore, plainly extends the retroactive ameliorative effects of Proposition 47 to mitigate any future collateral consequence of
a felony conviction that is reduced under the measure.”) (emphasis in original), quoting
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k).
140 People v Foster, 447 P3d 228, 232 (Cal 2019), citing Buycks, 422 P3d at 540.
141 Buycks, 422 P3d at 540.
142 Id at 541.
136
137
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language, 143 the court noted that “Proposition 47 was intended to
broadly mitigate the collateral penal consequences of certain narcotics and larceny-related offenses.” 144 Thus, under state precedent, reclassified convictions can only be predicate felonies for
judgments that were final when Proposition 47 took effect. 145
In sum, the California Supreme Court interpreted the “for all
purposes” language to require that redesignated convictions be
treated as misdemeanors in most state sentencing proceedings.
This holding was largely based on Proposition 47’s intent to
broadly ameliorate the consequences of certain convictions. As
the next section demonstrates, the federal courts have not deferred to Proposition 47’s intent or to the California Supreme
Court’s interpretation of California law.
D. Federal Circuit Courts’ Approach to Proposition 47
The California Supreme Court’s holding applies only to state
sentencing; federal law determines Proposition 47’s effect on federal sentencing. And federal circuit courts have uniformly disregarded California’s interpretation of Proposition 47. 146 In a variety of contexts, courts have held that convictions reclassified
under Proposition 47 still count as predicate offenses for federal
recidivist enhancements, including § 841 of the CSA and the
Guidelines’ enhancements.

See id.
Id at 543.
145 Buycks, 422 P3d at 543. The California Supreme Court relied on the principle articulated in In re Estrada, 408 P2d 948 (Cal 1965). See Buycks, 422 P3d at 542–43. The
Estrada rule presumes that in the absence of a “clear intention concerning any retroactive
effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law
to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that
are final and sentences that are not.’” Id at 542, quoting People v Conley, 373 P3d 435, 440
(Cal 2016).
146 Starting with the Ninth Circuit, all circuit courts to consider the issue have held
that reclassification under Proposition 47 does not affect federal sentencing. See, for example, United States v Diaz, 838 F3d 968, 971 (9th Cir 2016). But before the Ninth Circuit
ruled on the issue, multiple judges in the Central District of California held otherwise. See
United States v Pagan, 2016 WL 8729980, *6 (CD Cal); United States v Norwood, 2016 WL
269571, *2–4 (CD Cal); United States v Summey, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 175511, *11 (CD
Cal). Even after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, one California district court interpreted the
Ninth Circuit’s binding decision as foreclosing the defendant’s statutory claim, but leaving
open constitutional issues. See Clay v United States, 2018 WL 6333671, *4 (CD Cal). The
court held that “it would violate [defendant’s] right to due process of law and the Eighth
Amendment to keep the 841(b)(1) enhancement in place after learning that his prior is
treated by clear retroactive state law as if it had never been a felony.” Id, citing Johnson,
544 US at 303.
143
144
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1. “Felony drug offense” under § 841 of the CSA.
All federal circuit courts to consider the issue have held that
a conviction reclassified under Proposition 47 is still a felony drug
offense under § 841 of the CSA’s recidivist enhancement. The
Third, 147 Seventh, 148 Eighth, 149 and Ninth 150 Circuits each considered defendants who challenged their mandatory § 841 enhancement on direct appeal because of a reclassified California conviction. 151 All employed similar reasoning. 152 They focused on the text
of § 841, which mandates a sentencing enhancement “after a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense has become final” 153 and noted
that “prior conviction” is defined by federal law, not state law. 154
Because § 841 is “backward-looking,” 155 they considered “whether
United States v London, 747 F Appx 80, 82 (3d Cir 2018).
United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 898–99 (7th Cir 2018).
149 United States v Santillan, 944 F3d 731, 732 (8th Cir 2019).
150 Diaz, 838 F3d at 971.
151 Because the defendants were sentenced prior to the First Step Act, their § 841
enhancements imposed a mandatory minimum. Joe Ramon Santillan received twenty
years, Vickie Sanders received ten, Anthony London received twenty, and Jesse Vasquez
(the defendant in Diaz) received life imprisonment. See Santillan, 944 F3d at 736; Sanders, 909 F3d at 898–99; London, 747 F Appx at 82; Diaz, 838 F3d at 971.
152 The courts all expressly relied on the other circuits’ decisions. The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Diaz, which was decided first, has been particularly influential. See, for example, Santillan, 944 F3d at 736 (“Because we find persuasive the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in [Diaz], we disagree [with the defendant].”).
153 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B) (1970), amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub L
No 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. See Santillan, 944 F3d at 732–33, quoting United States v
Funchess, 422 F3d 698, 703 (8th Cir 2010) (looking to the language of § 841 and explaining
that whether to apply “the prior drug conviction enhancement . . . is a matter of statutory
interpretation”); Sanders, 909 F3d at 901 (“As always, we must begin[ ] with the plain
language of the statute. . . . Section 841(b) states that a defendant is subject to a ten-year
minimum term of imprisonment if she commits a federal drug offense ‘after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final.’”), quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B) (quotation marks and citations omitted); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“[W]e begin the same way
we begin all inquiries involving statutory interpretation—with the text of the statutory
provision. . . . [The statute] requires only that the defendant commit his federal offense
after his prior conviction ‘has become final.’”), quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A); Diaz, 838
F3d at 974 (“‘[A]s a matter of plain statutory meaning there [is] . . . no question’ the defendant committed his crime ‘after a [prior state felony] conviction’ has become final.”)
(emphasis in original), quoting United States v Dyke, 718 F3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir 2013).
154 See Santillan, 944 F3d at 733 (“[T]he question of what constitutes a ‘prior conviction’ for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A) is a matter of federal, not state, law.”) (quotation marks
and citations omitted); Sanders, 909 F3d at 900 (“To determine whether a defendant has
a prior state conviction for purposes of applying a federal recidivism enhancement provision, we look to federal law.”); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“The interpretation of [§ 841] is
a matter of federal law, rather than state law.”); Diaz, 838 F3d at 972 (“Federal law, not
state law, governs our interpretation of federal statutes.”).
155 Santillan, 944 F3d at 733, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973; Sanders, 909 F3d at 901,
quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973; London, 747 F Appx at 84, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973.
147
148
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the defendant was previously convicted, not the particulars of
how state law later might have permitted relief from the defendant’s state conviction.” 156 The circuits thus held that California’s
later decision to reclassify the defendant’s felony to a misdemeanor did not change the fact that the defendant’s prior conviction for a felony drug offense had become final. 157
Beyond this statutory conclusion, multiple circuits explained
that affording a defendant relief in his federal sentence, despite
prior criminal history, is contrary to § 841’s purpose of punishing
recidivism. 158 They also emphasized that “[i]gnoring later state
actions for purposes of federal sentences . . . aligns with the Supreme Court’s repeated admonishments that federal laws should
be construed to achieve national uniformity.” 159 Finally, the circuits noted that, unlike other federal sentencing statutes, Congress did not include a provision explicitly saying that changes in
state law retroactively affect § 841. 160
The reasoning of these § 841 cases has influenced other decisions involving Proposition 47’s effect on federal sentencing. As
156 Santillan, 944 F3d at 733, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74; Sanders, 909 F3d at
901, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74; London, 747 F Appx at 84, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d
at 973–74; Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74, quoting Dyke, 718 F3d at 1293.
157 See Santillan, 944 F3d at 733 (“Santillan was convicted of possession of marijuana
for sale . . . , which was a felony under California law at that time. Thus, his California
conviction qualifies as a ‘felony drug offense’ notwithstanding the fact it was later redesignated as a misdemeanor.”); Sanders, 909 F3d at 901 (“California’s later decision to reclassify the felony as a misdemeanor ‘does not alter the historical fact of the [prior state]
conviction becoming final—which is what § 841 requires.’), quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974
(quotation marks and citation omitted); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“[T]he decision of California voters to enact Proposition 47 does not change the fact that London committed his
federal offense ‘after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense ha[d] become final.’”),
quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A).
158 See Sanders, 909 F3d at 902 (“[I]t’s unclear why a [federal] statute aimed at punishing recidivism . . . would afford the defendant relief in his federal sentence.”), quoting
Diaz, 838 F3d at 974; London, 747 F Appx at 85 (“The sentence enhancements in § 841
are also meant to combat recidivism. That purpose would not be served by affording a
defendant relief from his federal sentence whenever a state provides him procedural relief
related to a previous state conviction after he has already committed another federal drug
offense.”), citing Diaz, 838 F3d at 974.
159 Sanders, 909 F3d at 902, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. See also London, 747 F
Appx at 85.
160 See Sanders, 909 F3d at 901–02 (noting that Congress ensured expunged convictions are disregarded under § 921(a)(20), but did not do so for § 841); London, 747 F Appx
at 85 n 5 (“Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to forms of relief under state
law that are unrelated to trial error or actual innocence, and it has done so in other contexts.”); Diaz, 838 F3d at 974 (“Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to changes
in state law for purposes of federal statutes for policy reasons unrelated to innocence or
an error of law. . . . Indeed, it has done so in other circumstances.”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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the following sections demonstrate, similar logic has been employed in cases regarding the Guidelines and postconviction constitutional challenges.
2. “Felony” under the Guidelines.
Relying on its earlier reasoning in its § 841 case, United
States v Diaz, 161 the Ninth Circuit—the only circuit to squarely
consider the issue—has held that convictions reclassified under
Proposition 47 still constitute felonies for the Guidelines’ sentencing enhancements. In two different cases, the court considered
the criminal history calculation 162 and an offense-specific enhancement. 163 In the latter, the specific enhancement increased
the defendant’s sentence for his federal immigration offense
based on a prior felony conviction “for which the sentence imposed
was five years or more.” 164 In the criminal history case, the district
court treating the reclassified conviction “as a felony” increased
the defendant’s criminal history points. 165
In both cases, the court explained that the proper approach
is to “look[ ] to a defendant’s status at the time he commits the
federal crime.” 166 It then held that Proposition 47 did not change
the “historical fact” of the defendant’s prior state conviction.167
Thus, just as in the § 841 context, a reclassified conviction triggered the Guidelines’ felony-based sentencing enhancements.

838 F3d 968 (9th Cir 2016).
See United States v Norwood, 733 F Appx 387, 389 (9th Cir 2018).
163 See United States v Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx 523, 534 (9th Cir 2019).
164 Id at 524, quoting USSG § 2L1.2(b)(3).
165 Norwood, 733 F Appx at 389. Treating the defendant’s conviction as a felony
yielded three criminal history points under USSG § 4A1.1(a), which directs courts to “[a]dd
3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” If
the district court had treated the conviction as a misdemeanor with a misdemeanant sentence of imprisonment imposed, only two points would have been added. See USSG
§ 4A1.1(b) (“Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days.”).
The defendant in Norwood also received two additional points because he was on parole
for his California conviction when he committed his instant federal offense. Norwood, 733
F Appx at 389.
166 Norwood, 733 F Appx at 389, quoting Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1090. See BermudezZamora, 788 F Appx at 524 (“Nor can we find in § 2L1.2(b)(3) any support for BermudezZamora’s contention that we should evaluate the status of his state conviction as of the
time he committed the federal offense, rather than the time of the original criminal conduct.”), citing McNeill, 563 US at 820.
167 Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx at 524, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. See Norwood,
733 F Appx at 389 (“The district court correctly determined that a reclassification under
Proposition 47 did not alter these ‘historical fact[s].’”), quoting Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1090.
161
162
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3. Postconviction relief for sentencing enhancements based
on reclassified convictions.
The prior cases dealt with defendants’ challenging of their enhanced sentences on direct appeal. Defendants have also reclassified their California offenses while imprisoned, and then challenged their enhanced federal sentence under § 2255, the primary
form of federal postconviction relief.168 Because denials of § 2255
motions can only be appealed if the defendant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” defendants
in the Proposition 47 context have—to varying extents—presented
constitutional arguments when petitioning for a certificate of appealability. 169 These petitions have generally been denied. 170
Reaching the merits of a § 2255 motion, the Tenth Circuit denied a defendant’s due process challenge to his § 841 enhancement predicated on a reclassified California conviction. 171 The defendant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, which
acknowledged a right to resentencing if a predicate offense has
been “successfully attacked, vacated, or set aside,” to argue that
his enhancement violated due process. 172 The Tenth Circuit relied
on other circuit court decisions to conclude that the defendant’s
California conviction “remain[ed] authorized” by law, and he
therefore “failed to demonstrate a due process violation” under
Johnson. 173
Thus, in a variety of contexts, the circuit courts have denied
defendants’ challenges to their federal sentencing enhancements
based on convictions reclassified under Proposition 47. The next
Part argues that this conclusion is not inevitable and that principles of comity support a contrary holding.

168 See 28 USC § 2255. For a further discussion of § 2255, see notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
169 28 USC § 2253(c)(2).
170 See United States v Ramos, 758 F Appx 316, 317 (4th Cir 2019) (holding that the
defendant did not show “that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong”); Munayco v United States, 2019
WL 2285470, *1 (11th Cir) (same); United States v Bell, 689 F Appx 598, 599 (10th Cir
2017) (holding that the defendant did not show “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further”).
171 United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 610–12 (10th Cir 2019).
172 Id at 612–13.
173 Id at 613.
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III. GIVING EFFECT TO RETROACTIVE STATE LAW CHANGES IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
The federal circuit courts’ conclusion—that Proposition 47
does not alter predicate offenses for federal sentencing—does not
necessarily follow from Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme
Court has never analyzed the effect of a retroactive state law, nor
has it conclusively determined what state action can alter predicate offenses.
This Part argues that federal courts should allow Proposition 47 to affect federal sentencing. Part III.A argues that Proposition 47 should be treated differently than other state laws considered by the Supreme Court—not only is Proposition 47 broader
than the expungement law considered by the Supreme Court in
Dickerson, it is much more akin to the state vacating the defendant’s conviction. Part III.B then argues that principles of comity
support federal courts following the California courts’ interpretation of Proposition 47. Finally, Part III.C discusses how this Comment’s argument will provide relief for many federal defendants.
Because the Supreme Court has not foreclosed treating retroactively reclassified state convictions as misdemeanors for federal
sentencing, this Comment argues that principles of comity and
federalism, as well as the positive benefits to federal defendants,
support giving Proposition 47 full effect in federal courts.
A. Legal Precedent Supports Giving Effect to Retroactive
Reclassification
1. Proposition 47 is broader than expungement or
dismissal.
The Supreme Court has only considered the effect of a state
expungement law and a state law that prospectively shortens an
offense’s length of imprisonment. The circuit courts have treated
Proposition 47 exactly like these laws. The Ninth Circuit, for example, stated that “Proposition 47 presents a slight variation on
what effect, if any, we must give to subsequent acts affecting a
prior state sentence.” 174 Other circuits even concluded that “dismissal or expungement is ‘a more drastic change than merely reclassifying [a conviction] as a misdemeanor’ under

174

Diaz, 838 F3d at 973 (emphasis added).
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Proposition 47.” 175 But because Proposition 47 alters the defendant’s underlying penalty, conviction, and conduct, it is broader
than these laws, and should be treated differently.
The California Supreme Court has explained that Proposition 47 alters the felonious nature of the defendant’s offense in
numerous ways. Even though Proposition 47 did not “expressly
mention recidivist offenders,” the court pointed to ballot materials stating that “the measure reduces the penalties for the following crimes,” which “extends logically to enhancements and subsequent offenses connected to those offenses.” 176 In other words,
California believes that these offenses simply do not deserve long
sentences or recidivist punishment; the penalty attached to certain conduct is fundamentally altered. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has explained that Proposition 47 changes the nature of the defendant’s underlying conduct. Under Proposition 47,
“the reduction of defendant’s [ ] conviction to a misdemeanor establishes that he cannot be regarded as having engaged in felonious criminal conduct.” 177 In California’s view, a certain class of
conduct is no longer dangerous or serious enough to be a felony.
Finally, the court has also held that Proposition 47 alters the underlying felony conviction, because its text “mandates that a ‘felony conviction . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.’” 178 Thus, prospectively and retroactively, the defendant’s
conviction accurately reflects California’s judgment on what conduct constitutes a felony and what penalties that conduct deserves.
Unlike the laws considered by the Supreme Court, Proposition 47 changes the defendant’s underlying conviction. The prospective change in length of imprisonment discussed in McNeill
did not. Nor did the expungement law at issue in Dickerson. The
Court explained in Dickerson: “[Expungement] in Iowa means no
more than that the State has provided a means for the trial court
not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under state
law.” 179 Like other postconviction relief, Proposition 47 intends to
ameliorate “certain continuing effects.” But in contrast to the
Iowa expungement at issue in Dickerson, Proposition 47
175 United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 615 (10th Cir 2019), quoting Diaz, 838 F3d
at 974. See also United States v London, 747 F Appx 80, 84 (3d Cir 2018) (“[W]e have held that
there is no impact on § 841 eligibility when the defendant’s prior state conviction is outright
dismissed following probation, which is a more drastic change than reclassification.”).
176 People v Buycks, 422 P3d 531, 545–46 (Cal 2018) (emphasis in original).
177 People v Valenzuela, 441 P3d 896, 904 (Cal 2019) (emphasis in original).
178 Buycks, 422 P3d at 548 (emphasis added), quoting Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k).
179 Dickerson, 460 US at 115.
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fundamentally changes the underlying conviction. According to
the text of the statute (and the California Supreme Court) the
conviction has been changed to a misdemeanor for all purposes.
Expungement only “attempt[s] to conceal prior convictions or to
remove some of their collateral or residual effects.” 180 Proposition 47 does not merely “conceal” prior convictions—it changes
them to misdemeanors.
Even though Proposition 47 changes the conviction from a
felony to a misdemeanor, “some of” the felony’s “residual effects”
remain. 181 For example, Proposition 47 does not apply if the defendant has a conviction for certain violent or sexual offenses.182
This is similar to a sentencing enhancement: if the defendant has
a designated prior offense, he receives a felony and a higher penalty. The more challenging issue with Proposition 47 is its firearm
provision, which prohibits firearm possession for individuals who
have received resentencing and does not remove these individuals’ felon status for purposes of California’s felon-in-possessionof-a-firearm law. 183 But the California Supreme Court has explained that this “single exception to the collateral effect of Proposition 47’s resentencing provisions” actually bolsters the argument that reclassified convictions cannot be predicate offenses. 184
Proposition 47’s “mandate to reduce penalties for a distinct class
of . . . offenses otherwise fully extends to enhancements and subsequent offenses alleged with those offenses.” 185 In other words,
because the firearm restriction is the sole exception to the “for all
purposes” language, no other exceptions—including recidivist enhancements—can be allowed.
Proposition 47 is also broader than other laws because it retroactively changes the defendant’s penalty by allowing resentencing and redesignation. Federal statutes and the Guidelines impose enhancements based on potential or actual length of
imprisonment—in other words, federal law cares about penalties
as a proxy for the crime’s severity. Expungement does not universally lower the offense’s penalty, unlike Proposition 47. Meanwhile, the law in McNeill did lower the offense’s penalty, but only
prospectively. Neither law indicates an intent by the state to
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id at 121.
See id.
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b), (i).
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k).
Buycks, 422 P3d at 546.
Id.
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reduce the penalty attached to certain conduct, both prospectively
and retroactively. In contrast, the California Supreme Court explained that Proposition 47 shows that certain conduct (possessory drug offenses and minor theft) is no longer “felonious criminal conduct.” 186 Although “conviction” is defined by federal law,
states still have the power to determine what conduct is criminal.
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Dickerson, “predicate offense[s] and [their] punishment are defined by the law of the
State.” 187 Proposition 47 changes what conduct is felonious. In
other words, the act of possessing drugs or committing petty theft
is no longer felonious in California. And by making this change retroactive, California made clear that this conduct was never felonious under state law. According to California’s current law and
(through retroactive reclassification) past law, possessing drugs or
committing minor theft cannot, and never did, constitute a felony.
Because Proposition 47 is broader than the laws considered
by the Supreme Court, it should be treated differently. But the
circuit courts disagree. They have limited the exceptions to the
general rule that state action does not affect federal sentencing to
actions based on legal error or actual innocence. And they have
largely ignored Proposition 47’s retroactivity, instead focusing on
the “historical fact” of conviction.
2. Federal courts should not focus on literal vacatur.
In treating Proposition 47 like “dismissal or expungement”
for federal sentencing purposes, the circuit courts have applied
their very narrow interpretation of “prior conviction.” 188 The circuits have generally held that state action does not affect the fact
of a prior conviction. 189 The exception to this rule, which stems
from Dickerson, is where the “predicate conviction ha[s] been vacated or reversed on direct appeal.” 190 Some circuits have indicated that this exception only applies if the vacatur was due to

186 See Valenzuela, 441 P3d at 904 (“[T]he theft of Ramirez’s $ 200 bicycle—the same
conduct that gave rise to defendant’s conviction for grand theft—constituted the felonious
criminal conduct involved with his conviction for street terrorism. In light of defendant’s
Proposition 47 resentencing, that theft can no longer be regarded as felonious.”).
187 Dickerson, 460 US at 112.
188 See, for example, McGee, 760 F Appx at 615, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974.
189 See Part II.B.
190 United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 902 (7th Cir 2018), quoting Dickerson, 460
US at 115.
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“innocence or errors of law,” at least for the Guidelines. 191 Other
circuits have indicated that state laws like expungement can
qualify for the Dickerson exception if they “alter[ ] the legality of
the original state conviction—such as where there was a trial error or it appears the defendant was actually innocent of the underlying crime.” 192
For multiple reasons, however, language from Supreme
Court cases suggests that circuit courts need not interpret this
exception so narrowly. The Court explained in Dickerson:
[W]e recognized an obvious exception to the literal language
of the statute for one whose predicate conviction had been
vacated or reversed on direct appeal. . . . But, in contrast, [expungement] does not alter the legality of the previous conviction and does not signify that the defendant was innocent of
the crime to which he pleaded guilty. . . . Clearly, firearms disabilities may be attached constitutionally to an expunged conviction, . . . and an exception for such a conviction, unlike one
reversed or vacated due to trial error, is far from obvious. 193
First, in this passage, the Court did not expressly state that vacated convictions are the only convictions that are exempted. Second, although trial error is an “obvious” exception, the Court did
not preclude other state laws from affecting the underlying convictions. Finally, the Court does not expressly define what it
means to “alter the legality of the previous conviction.” Taken together, this demonstrates that the Court left open the possibility
of a broader definition of which state actions alter the underlying
conviction for federal sentencing.
In Johnson, the Court similarly declined to define when exactly an underlying conviction can be altered for federal sentencing. In a series of sentencing procedure cases leading up to Johnson, the Court consistently recognized that “a defendant who
successfully attack[s] his state conviction in state court or on federal habeas review [can] then ‘apply for reopening of any federal

191 See, for example, United States v Martinez-Cortez, 354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004)
(“If [defendant]’s convictions had been vacated for the express purpose of enabling him to
become eligible for the safety valve, the sentences would have counted because the convictions would have been set aside for reasons unrelated to his innocence or errors of law.”).
192 Diaz, 838 F3d at 973, citing United States v Norbury, 492 F3d 1012, 1015 (9th
Cir 2007).
193 Dickerson, 460 US at 115.
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sentence enhanced by the state sentences.’” 194 At times the Johnson opinion seems to suggest that a “successful attack” means a
state vacatur: “Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given
a sentence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is vacated.” 195 At other times, it focuses on the validity of the prior conviction: “Congress does not
appear to have adopted a policy of enhancing federal sentences
regardless of the validity of state convictions relied on for the enhancement.” 196 “Validity” is not defined, but implies something
broader than just vacatur. Unlike vacatur, “validity” does not suggest a specific state procedure. Nor is it necessarily limited to legal error or actual innocence. Rather, an invalid conviction implies that it is not recognized in state court—just like reclassified
convictions are not recognized as felonies in California court.
When analyzing Proposition 47, the circuit courts conflated
these different terms, at times using “vacated,” and at times using
“successfully attacked.” The Seventh Circuit, for example,
acknowledged that laws altering “the legality of the original state
conviction” mean the conviction cannot be a predicate offense.197
But it then stated: “Proposition 47 [ ] does not ‘vacate’ prior felony
convictions; it reclassifies them as misdemeanors. Thus, Johnson
is not helpful to [the defendant]’s argument.” 198 This argument
implies a law must vacate a conviction to affect federal sentencing. Similarly, although the Tenth Circuit stated that Johnson
applies where the predicate conviction was “vacated or successfully attacked,” it went on to distinguish “between a conviction
that has been vacated because of a constitutional error or actual
innocence and a conviction that has merely been reclassified as a
matter of legislative grace.” 199
Proposition 47’s effect on nonfinal judgments is more similar
to state vacatur than expungement. The Seventh Circuit explained: “When a state court ‘vacates’ a prior conviction, it, in effect, nullifies that conviction; it is as if that conviction no longer

194 Johnson, 544 US at 303 (emphasis added), quoting Custis v United States, 511 US
485, 497 (1994).
195 Johnson, 544 at 303 (emphasis added).
196 Id at 305–06 (emphasis added). See also id at 303 (“[T]he mandatory enhancement
under the [ACCA] has [not] been read to mean that the validity of a prior conviction supporting an enhanced federal sentence is beyond challenge.”).
197 Sanders, 909 F3d at 903.
198 Id.
199 McGee, 760 F Appx at 615 (emphasis added).
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exists.” 200 This is what California did for nonfinal judgments—for
state purposes, the felony conviction no longer exists. California
has decided that the underlying conduct no longer constitutes a
felony. Thus, the penalties and collateral effects of a felony conviction can no longer attach to drug possession and minor theft.
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit cites to a California court that
explained precisely this point:
[O]ne of the “chief” reasons for reclassifying a felony as a misdemeanor “is that under such circumstances the offense is
not considered to be serious enough to entitle the court to resort to it as a prior conviction of a felony for the purposes of
increasing the penalty for a subsequent crime.” 201
Despite acknowledging that California did “not consider[ ]” possessory drug offenses “to be serious enough” to be a felony conviction, 202 the Seventh Circuit treated it exactly like a felony. 203
Unlike postconviction relief that simply offers legislative
grace, Proposition 47 comes much closer to altering the underlying legality of the felony conviction. A successful petition for redesignation or resentencing in state court also comes closer to the
other terms the Supreme Court used in Johnson—a “successful attack” changing the underlying “validity” of the felony conviction.
3. Retroactivity alters the historical fact of conviction.
Finally, and importantly, the Supreme Court has never ruled
on how a retroactive state law affects federal sentencing. The
Court’s holding in McNeill only applies to state laws that prospectively lower the term of imprisonment, and the Court expressly
declined to decide what would happen if that state law was retroactively applied to defendants. 204
Despite this open question, the circuits either rejected or
failed to meaningfully consider the effect of Proposition 47’s retroactivity. The circuits explained that although Congress could
“give retroactive effect to changes in state law[s]” and has in other
situations, it did not do so for § 841. 205 The Third Circuit had no

200
201
202
203
204
205

85 n 5.

Sanders, 909 F3d at 902.
Id at 900, quoting People v Abdallah, 201 Cal Rptr 3d 198, 206 (2016).
Sanders, 909 F3d at 900.
Id at 903.
McNeill, 563 US at 825 n 1.
Sanders, 909 F3d at 901–02, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974; London, 747 F Appx at
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further analysis regarding Proposition 47’s retroactivity. The
Ninth Circuit first noted that it is unclear whether California applies Proposition 47 retroactively, an issue which has since been
decided by the California Supreme Court. 206 The Ninth Circuit
then explained that “even if California decided to give Proposition 47 retroactive effect for purposes of its own state law, that
would not retroactively make [the defendant]’s felony conviction
a misdemeanor for purposes of federal law.” 207 To support this, the
court simply reiterated that “§ 841 explicitly tells us when it applies,” and that § 841 applies in this case. 208 The Tenth Circuit
extensively quoted the Ninth Circuit’s decision without expanding on it. 209 Finally, the Seventh Circuit briefly mentioned the
Eleventh Circuit’s examination of a retroactive New York sentencing law. The Seventh Circuit, quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s
language that discusses McNeill, explained “that the defendant
could ‘succeed on the merits of his [challenge to his federal sentencing enhancement] only if the New York sentencing reductions
apply retroactively.’” 210 The Seventh Circuit stated that this was
“mere dicta,” without engaging in the retroactivity argument. 211
Retroactivity should impact the federal courts’ analysis because it alters the “historical fact” of conviction. In McNeill, the
Court explained why a prospective state law change did not alter
the historical fact of conviction: “A defendant’s history of criminal
activity—and the culpability and dangerousness that such history demonstrates—does not cease to exist when a State reformulates its criminal statutes in a way that prevents precise translation of the old conviction into the new statutes.” 212
When federal courts find the historical fact of conviction, they
are not finding the underlying culpability or dangerousness of a
defendant. Rather, the only fact that they are constitutionally allowed to find is the fact of conviction. 213 And the Supreme Court
has noted that “a claim of [the fact of conviction] is subject to proof
or disproof like any other factual issue.” 214 Under Proposition 47,
See Diaz, 838 F3d at 974–75.
Id at 975 (emphasis in original).
208 Id.
209 See McGee, 760 F Appx at 615, citing Diaz, 838 F3d 968.
210 Sanders, 909 F3d at 903–04, quoting Cortes-Morales v Hastings, 827 F3d 1009,
1014 (11th Cir 2016).
211 Sanders, 909 F3d at 904.
212 McNeill, 563 US at 823.
213 See Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490 (2000).
214 Johnson, 544 US at 307.
206
207
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a defendant’s historical conviction can be disproved, because the
fact of the defendant’s felony ceases to exist. California has
reached back into the defendant’s history and changed a felony to
a misdemeanor. This reclassification does not prevent “precise
translation of the old conviction.” Rather, it facilitates a very clear
translation of the old conviction (felony) to the new conviction
(misdemeanor).
The emphasis on the historical fact of conviction explains why
courts look to the law at the time of conviction, rather than current law. But with retroactive laws, looking to historical law produces odd results. Under Proposition 47, California declared that
the historical statute does not exist, even for defendants convicted
under that statute. A passage from McNeill highlights the problems with the historical fact approach:
Although North Carolina courts actually sentenced him to 10
years in prison for his drug offenses, McNeill now contends
that the maximum term of imprisonment for those offenses
is 30 or 38 months. We find it hard to accept the proposition
that a defendant may lawfully [have] be[en] sentenced to a
term of imprisonment that exceeds the “maximum term of
imprisonment . . . prescribed by law.” 215
Because the North Carolina statute was not retroactive, McNeill’s
longer sentence was still lawful. In California, on the other hand,
it is not lawful for people with reclassified convictions to serve a
longer felony term; when their sentence is reclassified, defendants are resentenced. Proposition 47 explicitly mandates that
“[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in the imposition of a term longer than the original sentence.” 216 Unlike
nonretroactive laws, a defendant can no longer lawfully be imprisoned based on his prior California conviction. Proposition 47’s
retroactivity therefore alters a key lynchpin in the courts’ analysis—the historical fact of conviction.
B. Federalism and Proposition 47
For the aforementioned reasons, this Comment concludes
that under federal law, the federal courts should give effect to
Proposition 47. This Section argues that even though federal law
defines federal recidivist enhancements, principles of comity and
215
216

McNeill, 563 US at 821 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(e).
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federalism support considering the state’s interpretation of its
law. Contrary to the federal courts’ argument, considering California’s interpretation of Proposition 47 does not undermine federal interests, including federal supremacy.
1. Principles of comity.
Comity is a difficult-to-define set of norms originally stemming from international law. 217 At its base, it refers to the general
principle that a governmental entity should respect another sovereign’s laws. 218 The Supreme Court has defined “comity” as “the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation.” 219 The Court
has also explained that comity “is neither a matter of absolute
obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will.” 220 In other
words, comity does not compel one sovereign to defer to another—
it is a voluntary decision. 221
Comity and federalism are closely related: because the states
are separate sovereigns, the federal government should respect
their laws and judgments. 222 As the Supreme Court famously described in Younger v Harris: 223
[Comity represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to
the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States. 224
217 Seinfeld, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1312 & n 6 (cited in note 130) (describing comity
as “[n]ebulous,” and noting that this description is “perhaps[ ] an understatement”).
218 Id. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Comity” as “[a]
principle or practice among political entities (as countries, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions), whereby legislative, executive, and judicial acts are mutually recognized”).
219 Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 164 (1895).
220 Id at 163–64.
221 See Sonja Larsen and Karl Oakes, 16 American Jurisprudence, Conflict of Laws
§ 11 (2d ed 2020).
222 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 1.5 at 40 (Aspen 3d ed 1999) (“A
related issue concerning federalism is comity—the deference federal courts owe to state
courts as those of another sovereign.”); Seinfeld, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1334 & n 98
(cited in note 130) (“[I]t is difficult to say how much independent work comity performs in
the cases involving duties that run from the federal government to the states, since it
conspires with related forces—most notably state sovereignty.”).
223 401 US 37 (1971).
224 Id at 44–45.
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The Supreme Court has frequently relied on comity in cases requiring the federal government to defer to the states. 225 The most
significant of these comity-based doctrines are the abstention doctrines, which require federal courts “to decline to exercise [their]
jurisdiction in favor of the jurisdiction of a state court.” 226 The
Court has also relied on comity to restrict federal habeas review
of state criminal convictions, 227 and federal supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. 228
Although the Supreme Court has relied on comity in these
areas of law, few courts have referenced these principles in the
Proposition 47 context, or in the context of state predicate offenses more generally. 229 But this context raises a particularly
strong argument for employing comity. Comity would direct federal courts to respect California’s treatment of Proposition 47—
its own criminal law. Because criminal law has traditionally been
the state’s domain, principles of comity and federalism are particularly salient. 230 However, increasing federalization of the criminal justice system has led to the current system of dual jurisdiction. 231 Under this system, “each sovereign—whether the Federal

225 See Seinfeld, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1332–34 (cited in note 130). However, Professor Gil Seinfeld notes that comity has not been relied upon to justify the state’s obligation to the federal government and offers several theories for this. What is important for
this Comment, however, is that in a comprehensive examination of the case law, decisions
involving the federal government’s obligations to state governments “treat comity as a
relevant norm.” Id at 1332.
226 Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 Mich L Rev 530, 534
(1989). See also James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 Stan L Rev 1049, 1050 n 1, 1051 n 5 (1994) (describing the various
abstention doctrines). The most important of the abstention doctrines comes from Younger
and requires federal courts to abstain from adjudicating requests for relief that would interfere with state criminal (and certain civil) proceedings. See Vikram David Amar, 17
Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright & Miller) § 4252 (Thomson Reuters 3d ed 2020).
227 See, for example, Francis v Henderson, 425 US 536, 541–42 (1976) (relying on
“considerations of comity and federalism” to limit collateral attacks on state convictions to
showings of actual prejudice).
228 See, for example, United Mine Workers of America v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725–26
(1966) (explaining that supplemental jurisdiction “need not be exercised in every case in
which it is found to exist,” and that “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided
both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties”).
229 The next Section discusses some federal courts that have discussed comity or federalism in this context. Additionally, Judge James A. Shapiro, a judge for the Circuit Court
of Cook County in Chicago, Illinois, has argued that under principles of comity, federal
courts should not treat state diversionary dispositions as convictions when applying the
Guidelines. See Shapiro, 41 Akron L Rev at 241–43 (cited in note 85).
230 See Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding
the Alarm or Crying Wolf, 50 Syracuse L Rev 1317, 1332 (2000).
231 Id at 1329–30.
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Government or a State—is responsible for the administration of
its own criminal justice system.” 232 Though at least one court has
argued that this means state law cannot infringe on federal law
by defining prior conviction, 233 there is another interpretation of
dual sovereignty. Under this view, because the state administers
its own criminal law and justice system, the federal government
should respect its decisions when possible.
This application of comity avoids several issues that arise in
other comity-based doctrines. Scholarly criticism of the use of
comity in the abstention doctrines does not apply to this Comment’s argument. 234 Most of these criticisms rest on the idea that
federal courts “are, or should be, the primary guardians of federal
rights” 235 and that abstention “hampers a plaintiff’s access to a
lower federal court, even though the federal court has jurisdiction.” 236 In the Proposition 47 context, comity does not prevent
any individual from pursuing their federal rights in federal court,
nor does it strip federal courts of their jurisdiction. Rather, federal courts will still interpret federal sentencing enhancements,
thus guarding the national government’s interests. But they will
also respect California’s decision to retroactively change what
conduct constitutes a felony, as well as a state court’s decision to
approve a retroactive change to the defendant’s underlying state
conviction. Looking to California’s treatment of reclassified convictions perfectly falls within the Supreme Court’s articulation of
comity without undermining federal interests. Federal courts
would recognize California’s legislative and judicial acts within
“its territory”—within the federal system.
2. Federal supremacy is not threatened by Proposition 47.
As discussed in the prior Section, issues of comity and federalism have not been emphasized in the Proposition 47 cases. Only
the Seventh Circuit considered any federalism argument. It summarily rejected the argument by explaining that the defendant did
not “identify any individual right embodied in the Constitution or
232 United States v Yepez, 704 F3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir 2012) (Yepez II), quoting Sester
v United States, 566 US 231, 241 (2012).
233 See Part II.B.2.
234 See Rehnquist, 46 Stan L Rev at 1052 n 7 (cited in note 226) (describing strands
of commentary criticizing the abstention doctrines); id at 1066 & nn 98–99 (collecting criticisms of the use of comity in the abstention doctrines, but noting that “comity is a convenient scapegoat for perceived defects in abstention doctrine”).
235 Id at 1067.
236 Friedman, 88 Mich L Rev at 535 (cited in note 226).
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in a federal statute that allows [her] to challenge [her] sentence
based on vague notions about the ‘principles of federalism.’”237 The
Seventh Circuit concluded: “Put simply, . . . federal law, and not
state law, ‘dictate[s] the meaning of a federal statute.’”238
However, the Ninth Circuit focused heavily on comity when
deciding whether a state court’s retroactive change to a defendant’s probation length affected his Guidelines calculation. 239 In
the initial panel decision (and the dissent from the en banc decision), Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw emphasized the comity argument from Younger v Harris. 240 The en banc majority rejected this
argument: “[G]ranting a state court the power to determine
whether a federal defendant is eligible for safety valve relief under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is closer to abdication than
comity.” 241 It concluded that “[s]tate courts cannot be given the
authority to change a defendant’s federal sentence by issuing a
ruling that alters history and the underlying facts.” 242
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s rejections of comity and federalism rest primarily on the idea of federal supremacy. This supremacy idea has been reiterated by many federal courts interpreting Proposition 47’s effect—state law cannot alter federal
law. The primary reason federal supremacy is not threatened under this Comment’s argument is that federal law still defines
“prior conviction.” Nothing—including principles of comity or federalism—requires federal courts to defer to the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of Proposition 47. This Comment
simply argues that federal courts should define prior conviction
more broadly, to account for the unique nature of Proposition 47
and California’s interpretation of it. But federal courts, not state
courts, still define federal law.
Moreover, it is unclear how the supremacy of federal law is
undermined by giving effect to California’s interpretation of state
law. The federal government’s interest is in “vindicat[ing] and
protect[ing] federal rights.” 243 Following a state’s interpretation of
237 Sanders, 909 F3d at 906, quoting Ramos v United States, 321 F Supp 3d 661, 668–
69 (ED Va 2018).
238 Sanders, 909 F3d at 906, quoting United States v Dyke, 718 F3d 1282, 1292 (10th
Cir 2013).
239 See notes 124–35 and accompanying text.
240 See United States v Yepez, 652 F3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir 2011) (Yepez I); Yepez II,
704 F3d at 1103 (Wardlaw dissenting).
241 Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091 (majority).
242 Id.
243 Younger, 401 US at 44.
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its laws does not extinguish any federal claim. 244 The federal
claim—prosecution of the defendant’s instant federal offense—is
not extinguished by a state’s interpretation of the predicate offense. Indeed, allowing states to prospectively change their underlying predicate offenses inherently gives them the “authority to
change a defendant’s federal sentence.”245 But no one argues that
Proposition 47’s prospective reclassification of certain offenses is
an abdication of federal law. Given this reality, it is not clear why
retroactive reclassification should be treated differently.
Similarly, the federal courts’ strong emphasis on federal law
ignores the fact that the national government has made federal
sentencing dependent on state law through recidivist enhancements. As the Ninth Circuit dissent articulated, “the entire concept of calculating criminal history points is predicated on respect
for and deference to state court criminal proceedings; the system
would unravel if district courts were to second-guess the motives
of every state court judge who had previously convicted or sentenced a defendant.” 246 This principle extends to all federal recidivist enhancements. Giving effect to the state’s interpretation of
its law does not abdicate control over federal law. Because recidivist enhancements are dependent on state law, considering the
state court’s criminal proceedings does not flout the supremacy of
federal law.
In sum, federal supremacy is not threatened by applying
principles of comity to federal recidivist enhancements. As the
next Section discusses, nor do other federal concerns counsel
against this application of comity.
3. Recidivism, national uniformity, and federal sentencing
concerns do not support the courts’ current approach.
In addition to overarching concerns about federal supremacy,
the circuits identified several additional federal concerns purportedly justifying their conclusion that Proposition 47 does not affect
federal sentencing. Many argued that giving effect to

244 See Seinfeld, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1324–25 (cited in note 130) (arguing that
supremacy-based justifications for state courts’ obligation to hear federal causes of action
are unpersuasive because it is unclear that “the supremacy of federal law is threatened by
a jurisdictional scheme that does not extinguish any federal claims, but instead reroutes
them to some other court”).
245 See Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091.
246 Id at 1098 (Wardlaw dissenting).
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Proposition 47 conflicts with Congress’s intent to punish recidivism. 247 Under this Comment’s argument, however, the federal
enhancements would still punish recidivism. The enhancements
would just punish felony offenses, rather than misdemeanor offenses. Going forward, people who commit most possessory drug
offenses and minor theft in California will not be “punished” under felony-based enhancements. If this is not contrary to Congress’s intent, it is unclear why giving retroactive effect to Proposition 47 is.
The circuits also noted that allowing Proposition 47 to affect
federal sentencing undermines national uniformity. 248 The concern regarding national uniformity is weak in this context. Because predicate offenses are based on irregular state law, an inherent lack of uniformity already exists. And defining conviction
historically creates a lack of uniformity prospectively—people
sentenced in California prior to Proposition 47 will receive different sentences than people sentenced after. Moreover, although
national uniformity has benefits, so too does local variance. For
example, local variance allows the states to act as laboratories of
democracy when enacting criminal justice reforms 249 and ensures
voters’ preferences are better reflected in sentencing laws. 250
Though not expressly articulated by any circuit, an additional concern with this Comment’s approach is that giving retroactive reclassification effect in federal sentencing will allow states
to change federal sentencing at will. This argument suggests that
states will retroactively alter many of their criminal offenses.
However, besides California, only Oklahoma has passed a retroactive reclassification law. 251 This seems to indicate that practical
and political safeguards will continue to mitigate any concern
about a flood of retroactive reclassification laws. 252 More

See, for example, Sanders, 909 F3d at 902, citing Diaz, 833 F3d at 974.
See note 159 and accompanying text.
249 See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand L Rev 783, 820
(2004) (noting the prevalence of “recent experiments with more fundamental [state drug
law] reforms, largely as a result of successful ballot initiative campaigns”).
250 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Colum L
Rev 1276, 1309 (2005) (“And if states do a better job of weighing costs and benefits, giving
more sentencing authority to the states than to the federal government could better reflect
the heterogeneous preferences of the voters.”).
251 See text accompanying notes 28–30.
252 Indeed, in various states, reclassification laws have been introduced, but have
failed to be enacted. See note 21 and accompanying text. And in at least one other state,
the legislature has tried to repeal its recently passed reclassification laws. See HB No 20–
247
248
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importantly, this concern must be tempered by respect for the
state’s ability to define its own laws. Because the federal government relies on state predicate offenses, it must trust the states to
define their initial offenses and punishments. This trust in the
states’ lawmaking ability—and respect for these laws under principles of comity—applies equally to retroactive reclassification.
The limiting principle of this Comment’s argument is trusting in
the state’s ability to legislate its criminal laws.
Indeed, the federal courts’ current approach raises a different—and perhaps more troubling—problem. Nothing (including
principles of comity or federalism) requires federal courts to respect California’s interpretation of Proposition 47. Although federal courts can continue to hold that Proposition 47 (and other
state laws) have no effect on prior convictions for federal sentencing purposes, this leads to concerning questions about states’ ability to control their predicate offenses. Even if California’s legislation had more clearly evinced an intent to erase prior state
convictions, it is unclear how federal courts would react. For example, the Supreme Court has established an exception for vacated convictions, suggesting that California should have declared possessory drug offenses “vacated.” 253 Even ignoring the
practical and legal issues with this approach, federal courts could
still refuse to give such vacaturs effect, because they would not be
based on legal error or actual innocence. 254 What then, if anything, can a state do to ensure its laws are effectuated in federal
court?
This Comment argues that a better approach is a fuller trust
in the states’ ability to enact criminal law. Part of this trust is
that when states decide to pass laws like Proposition 47, they are
given effect in federal court. Because federal defendants are incarcerated based on state offenses, effectuating state ameliorative
laws in federal court will provide relief to state and federal prisoners. The next Section discusses how this Comment’s proposed
conclusion would impact federal sentencing.

1150, Colorado General Assembly, 77th General Assembly, 2d Regular Sess (Jan
17, 2020).
253 Dickerson, 460 US at 115.
254 See notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
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C. Impact on Federal Sentencing and Resentencing
In addition to impacting the general federal-state balance of
power, holding that Proposition 47 affects federal sentencing
would directly impact federal sentencing and federal prisoners.
Nearly 1,000,000 people are eligible for reclassification under
Proposition 47, and almost 280,000 reclassification petitions were
submitted between Proposition 47’s enactment on November
2014 and September 2016. 255
It is not obvious how this Comment’s interpretation of Proposition 47 affects people currently serving an enhanced federal sentence. The California Supreme Court has mostly avoided this issue
by holding that state prisoners can challenge already-imposed
state enhancements only if the judgment containing the enhancement was not final when Proposition 47 was enacted. 256 This distinction has been suggested by some district courts, but not the
circuit courts. 257 If federal courts defer to California’s interpretation of Proposition 47’s retroactivity, most postconviction relief
would be barred—only those whose federal judgments were not
final could challenge their enhanced sentences.
However, this Comment’s argument would affect federal prisoners who received a federal enhancement after reclassifying
their California offense but were denied relief by a federal court.
Whether federal prisoners can receive postconviction relief in this
case depends on a number of factors, including whether the defendant has previously filed for relief. Section 2255, 258 the principal form of federal postconviction relief, sharply limits “second or
successive motion[s]” to situations where there is “newly discovered evidence” or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court.” 259 This would likely bar any federal prisoner who already brought a § 2255 motion. In some
255 Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *14 (cited in note 19). The final number
of petitioners will be clear shortly, because all petitions must be submitted on or before
November 4, 2022, unless there is a showing of good cause. See Cal Penal Code
§ 1170.18(j).
256 See Part II.C.
257 In United States v Pagan, 2016 WL 8729980 (CD Cal), the Central District of California held that the defendant’s reclassified conviction was no longer a predicate offense
for § 841. Id at *6–7. The court distinguished another district court case that reached the
opposite holding, because Ashley Pagan was not yet convicted or sentenced for his federal
enhancement, whereas the other “defendant was already convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment.” Id at *6, citing United States v Spearman, 2015 WL 13776957, *1–2
(CD Cal).
258 For a brief discussion of the mechanics of this provision, see Part II.D.3.
259 28 USC § 2255(h).

1842

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1799

circuits, however, federal prisoners could file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, which is distinct from § 2255. 260 Federal prisoners
can bring a writ of habeas corpus at any time if the prisoner’s
§ 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.” 261 The circuits are deeply split on what qualifies
as “inadequate or ineffective.” 262 Thus, whether a defendant who
already filed a § 2255 motion could receive relief under habeas is
highly dependent on the circuit.
If the defendant has not previously filed a § 2255 motion, she
can likely receive relief. Enhancements based on vacated or “successfully attacked” convictions can be challenged under § 2255
motions. 263 Section 2255’s one-year statute of limitations normally runs from the date the defendant’s federal conviction became final. 264 The Supreme Court has held that this one-year period restarts “when a petitioner receives notice of the order
vacating the prior conviction, provided that he has sought it with
due diligence in state court, after entry of judgment in the federal
case with the enhanced sentence.” 265 This suggests that the statute of limitations would run from the date the defendant receives
notice of her Proposition 47 reclassification, as long as she acted
diligently in obtaining the reclassification. 266
Allowing Proposition 47 to affect federal sentencing would
clearly impact people who violate a federal statute after reclassifying their California conviction. In that case—just like in California
state court—the predicate offense no longer exists. Any felonybased federal enhancement is simply unavailable. Thus, people
260 See 28 USC § 2241. Section 2241, the codification of the traditional writ of habeas
corpus, has been largely displaced by § 2255. See LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 28.9(a)
(cited in note 92).
261 28 USC § 2255(e). Section 2255(e) also prohibits courts from reviewing § 2241 petitions by prisoners “authorized to apply for relief under § 2255.” See LaFave, Criminal
Procedure § 28.9(b) (cited in note 92) (quotation marks omitted). Taken together,
§ 2255(e)—also called the “savings clause”—allows federal prisoners to obtain relief under
§ 2241 only under the “inadequate or ineffective” language. See id.
262 See Lauren Casale, Note, Back to the Future: Permitting Habeas Petitions Based
on Intervening Retroactive Case Law to Alter Convictions and Sentences, 87 Fordham L
Rev 1577, 1588–97 (2019).
263 Johnson, 544 US at 303 (“Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given a sentence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is
vacated.”).
264 See 28 USC § 2255(f)(1).
265 Johnson, 544 US at 298.
266 See United States v Summey, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 175511, *5–6 (CD Cal) (holding
that § 2255’s statute of limitation runs from when the Proposition 47 designation of defendant’s prior conviction became discoverable).

2020]

Proposition 47 and Federal Sentencing

1843

who reclassify their convictions and subsequently violate a federal statute will likely receive lower sentences.
The inherent safeguards on postconviction relief limit any
negative effects of this Comment’s argument by ensuring federal
judges are not flooded with requests for postconviction relief. Importantly, however, this Comment would allow for resentencing
under § 2255 for some federal prisoners. Moreover, if reclassified
California convictions no longer constitute predicate felonies, it
would deeply impact defendants’ sentences moving forward.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 47 is one of many recent state reforms attempting to ameliorate harsh criminal laws. Unlike many other state
laws, Proposition 47 explicitly intends to mitigate the collateral
effects of a felony conviction. The California Supreme Court has
therefore held that reclassified felony convictions are misdemeanors for the purpose of state sentencing enhancements. The federal
courts, however, have held that reclassified convictions are still
felonies for the purpose of federal sentencing enhancements.
If the Seventh Circuit had given effect to California’s reclassification of Vickie Sanders’s conviction, she would have received
a five-year sentence for her simple drug possession. 267 Instead, her
reclassified conviction—which California treats as a misdemeanor—triggered a ten-year sentencing enhancement. 268 The
Seventh Circuit’s approach is not mandated by Supreme Court
precedent. The Court has left open the issue of retroactive state
law changes. And Proposition 47 is more than just a retroactive
state law change. It does not merely offer legislative grace ameliorating the collateral effects of a felony conviction. It represents
California’s substantive decision that certain conduct—possessory drug offenses and petty theft—is not, and never has been, a
felony. Federal courts should give effect to California’s decision.
Of course, federal courts could continue to hold that federal
sentencing is not affected by Proposition 47 or any similar state
law in the future. This leads to the troubling outcome that
states—no matter their intent or clear language—cannot do anything to alter their own predicate offenses. Nor can they enact

267 United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 898 (7th Cir 2018). Sanders also received a
concurrent sentence of eighty-seven months for her remaining five counts relating to manufacturing drugs. Id at 899.
268 Id.
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truly retroactive state laws or erase prior state convictions. Federal courts should not reach this conclusion. Rather, federal
courts should give effect to states’ clear intent in enacting ameliorative laws. In this case, federal courts should listen to California’s intent and hold that a reclassified California conviction is
not a prior conviction for federal sentencing.

